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University of Newcastle, New South Wales abstract: Lever-Tracy has hit the nail on the head when she points to the reluctance of sociologists to consider the social implications of global warming. Meanwhile the discussion of these issues in other disciplines grows apace. Ecological modernizers see the environmental crisis as a stimulus to capitalist societies, providing new opportunities for growth from re-tooling. Yet, sections of the environmentalist movement envisage necessary social change as much more profound. A key to this debate is the likely costs of re-tooling. This technological and financial question is a prerequisite for understanding the social implications. If the costs of retooling are huge, as can be argued, some drastic social changes are quite likely.
keywords: global warming ✦ social change ✦ sociology ✦ technology This is a welcome article for sociologists. As Lever-Tracy observes, sociologists have generally failed to notice global warming as a problem with huge social consequences, whether the impacts destroy current societies or we do something effective and massively alter society through that (Leahy, 1994) . Lever-Tracy is probably right about where the sociologists have gone. The discipline has been founded on the premise that society is socially constructed, not determined by nature. Thinking about environmental catastrophe requires us to envisage utopias and dystopias of the future; something that postmodernism and Foucault have ruled out (Coates and Leahy, 2006; Curran, 2007; George, 1999; Leahy, 2004; F. Trainer, 1985; T. Trainer 1995) .
Taking up an issue she raises, I defend the view that the changes necessary to halt global warming are difficult to contain within capitalism. As Lever-Tracy points out, 'Ecological Modernization' denies this. In fact, this school argues, massive investment in new energy infrastructure will resolve an accumulation crisis by soaking up the surplus -'the frontier for a new period of accumulation' (Lever-Tracy, this issue, p. 00). From this perspective, subsidies and political regulation are pump priming for a new round of capitalist expansion.
In popular debate, the alternatives are posed like this. Environmentalist radicals are ideologically driven extremists who seek drastic reductions in material production and consumption. The modernizers want to preserve affluence through the path of material re-tooling. Put like that, you would have to be a total curmudgeon to choose the first path, especially when people in most developing countries are still to reach even moderate affluence.
However, posing the alternatives in this way makes a lot of assumptions about the likely costs and consequences of the material re-tooling necessary. What if the material re-tooling required is so very expensive and major as to imply a drastic reduction in material production and consumption? A thorough analysis of these issues has been conducted by Ted Trainer (1995 , and a number of other authors have come to similar conclusions -for example Heinberg (2003) . This is a complicated topic and the following but a brief guide.
Carbon sequestration is untried except on a very small scale; it is hard to estimate the cost for coal-fired plants. It would not be possible in almost all existing power stations, so there could be decades before it could be installed in new plants. Emissions from power stations would have to be liquefied and sent in pipes underground. For example, 30 million tonnes (t) per day in Australia. Total energy costs could go up by 40 percent and total plant generation costs double. Only particular geological formations could keep the liquefied gas underground. In eastern Australia, there are insufficient suitable sites on land, and we would quickly use up all suitable sites, even those under the oceans. Carbon sequestration for coalfired plants does nothing for uses of fossil fuel where emissions are not concentrated at one point of combustion. So only about a third of the carbon released now could be captured. If we were to replace other uses of fossil fuels with electricity from coal-fired plants (running transport on electric power) we would use up coal in decades, given growth in energy usage (Trainer, 2007: 110-11) .
Nuclear power seems cheap; roughly equating to the current costs of wind power at the point of production. But there are other problems. If present electricity demand were to be met with nuclear reactors, highgrade uranium ores would be used up in three years. Nine billion people in 2070 with present-day rich-world per capita energy consumption would need 100,000 reactors. Or the same figure if we just factor in a 3 percent growth rate of present-day unequal energy consumption to 2070. If these 100,000 plants were breeders, as planned, they would contain 4 t of plutonium each, with accompanying safety problems. With the rate of ageing of plants, we would have to bury 4000 old reactors every year. In fact, the programme to replace fossil fuel energy with nuclear power runs into other problems in terms of our diverse uses of fossil energy. In Australia, 20 percent of the energy we use (final energy) is in the form of electricity. Replacing all our power stations with nuclear plants would do nothing to solve the greenhouse problems with the other 80 percent of the energy we use (Trainer, 2007: 119-24) .
Current optimistic estimates of the costs of nuclear power do not include the costs of storing the nuclear waste in the long term. Only one country, Sweden, has actually begun to create a long-term waste depository. In 1999, Swedes voted to end their nuclear programme. By 1997, they had generated 2500 t of high-level nuclear waste and were planning a facility to store 9000 t. They had set aside a fund to cover this of 21 billion Swedish kroner. Seeing what the Swedes are planning makes it clear that the costs would be huge if we were to supply a large part of our energy with nuclear power and constantly produce this waste. They are planning disposal in copper/steel canisters, surrounded by bentonite clay, in holes drilled into rock tunnels cut into stable Swedish crystalline bedrock, 500 m below the surface (Hogberg et al., n.d.; Martin and Christiansson, 2002) . A similarly daunting evaluation is Gordon Brown's US$90 billion estimate to decommission the UK's ageing nuclear plants (Diesendorf, 2007: 260) .
Beyond these cost constraints, there are also safety problems associated with a nuclear economy. We would have tonnes of plutonium zipping about the globe. Each reactor today produces 200 kg of plutonium per year and a bomb could be made from 10 kg. With 100,000 reactors, the security implications are frightening (Trainer, 2007: 120, 123) .
Wind is the cheapest renewable energy but there is no cheap way of storing or transporting the energy produced by wind. If we think of using excess wind power to create hydrogen as storage, the costs would go through the roof -the capital cost could be about 11 times that of a coalfired power plant plus fuel (Trainer, 2007: 34) . We do not even have enough good wind sites. For example, if Australia were to supply half its energy from wind via a hydrogen system that used 4 units of electricity to store 1 unit for later, we would need 200 times the area we have in New South Wales and Victoria with wind speeds sufficient to drive the turbines (Trainer, 2007: 35) . Then there is wind variability. Wind speeds are below what is needed for power generation a good part of the year, even if we source electricity across whole continents. We would have to have backup generation in coal or some other source, with a duplication of expenses. To meet anything like present energy demands, we would be using a lot of coal-fired power plant to back up the system when winds are down -much too much to meet global warming targets. Solar thermal energy is the cheapest solar power. Short-term storage of heat energy in molten salt is the most probable means of dealing with night-time use and occasional cloudy days. Looking at a reasonably good site -outback Australia -we can get the following idea of how much capacity we would need to install to equate to a coal-fired plant. Building the storage system for a 1000 MW power station to store heat for three days of cloudy weather would cost 2.5 times as much as the cost of building a coal-fired plant (Trainer, 2007: 47) . A solar plant could not produce peak capacity most of the year, given winter, night-times and cloudy days. So you would have to build more plant capacity to produce the same amount of energy in a year as would come from a coal-fired plant. It would cost 7.5 times as much money to match the capacity of a coal-fired power plant to deliver energy over a whole year (Trainer, 2007: 45 ). Yet, this is an annual total. In winter, sun angles are low, and ambient temperatures are cold so that solar systems do not produce their best output. In fact, to be able to supply the same amount of power in winter as that produced in summer, the capacity of the plant would have to be five times that required in summer. As a result of all these factors (winter sun angles, nights, cloudy days, costs of storage), costs in winter to supply an equivalent amount of power could easily be more than 15 times the costs of the coal-fired plant (Trainer, 2007: 47) . Solar thermal systems are only practicable closer than 34º to the equator. So, they are not much use in the northern regions where population is concentrated. To move power from the Sahara to Europe, losses would be great, both in transporting the electricity and in the expense necessary to construct this infrastructure (Trainer, 2007: 56) .
Biomass is a sad joke to replace oil and gas. To meet current demand in the US, we would have to harvest biomass from 1162 million ha -nine times all US cropland and eight times all presently forested land in the US (Trainer, 2007: 87) . Hydrogen is not a practicable alternative -the difficulties in storing hydrogen add massively to the weight necessary to transport it. To supply an auto station with hydrogen would take 15 times more tankers than required to supply the same amount of energy as petrol (Trainer, 2007: 94) . Fuel cells to run cars would deliver energy at more than 10 times the cost of energy delivered by a petrol engine (Trainer, 2007: 99) .
There are all sorts of reasons why these costs cannot come down. For example, the costs of steel for framework, and glass for solar mirrors are in themselves the cost constraint on solar plants. Economies of scale are not going to make a big difference. A transition away from fossil fuels of the magnitude required would quickly go past energy conservation and into the very expensive territory of alternative energy provision. Additional to the daily running costs of all these alternatives is the sudden and very expensive conversion of our existing energy, transport and agricultural systems within decades.
Current emissions from fossil fuel burning are 6 gigatonnes per year (Gt/y). Four hundred parts per million (ppm) is the concentration of CO 2 that we would have to aim at to avoid catastrophic effects such as the blocking of the Gulf Stream and the consequent freezing of Europe and the US, or the release of methane from the ocean floor and the permafrost, creating a warming feedback loop. This concentration is pretty close to the current 380 ppm -up from 280 ppm over at least the last 750,000 years. To maintain 400 ppm, we would have to cut emissions to 0.5 Gt/y by 2040 and then in subsequent years extract carbon from the atmosphere. This is a reduction of 92 percent from present emissions. This is extreme enough. In per capita terms the situation is even more drastic. If this target of fuel emissions were shared equally between 9 billion people (in 2050), it would be about 1-2 percent of present rich-world per capita use. So even if we kept use of fossil fuels below 2 percent of our current per capita use in developing countries, we would have to reduce our own use to the same level (Trainer, 2007: 2) . As shown earlier, this fossil fuel energy cannot be readily replaced by any feasible alternative technology (Trainer, 1995 (Trainer, , 2007 . The consequence of this energy-scarce regime would be a drastic reduction in material consumption; whether this would be experienced as impoverishing is debatable. It may be considered that a rosy view of the costs of alternatives is often promoted to persuade the political allies of capitalism to get moving and do something.
Backing up a simple assessment are two further factors. One is that a capitalist economy expands continuously. The capitalist economy is a growth economy by virtue of competitive private ownership (McLaughlin, 1993) . It also works politically because of this feature -constantly promising increased consumption to those who are on the receiving end of exploitative bad deals (Leahy, 2003) . As Trainer points out, the effect is that with a very normal 3 percent growth rate -the kind necessary to keep employment levels constant in the rich countries -there is a doubling of production and consumption in decades. At a continuing world growth rate of 3 percent per annum, we will have four times the output of products by 2050 and eight times by 2075. With a 4 percent growth rate that would be 16 times (Trainer, 2007: 115, 128) . This means that if we aim for an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse gases from 1990 levels by 2050, we are not just replacing 80 percent of our current energy use with renewables, but we also have to provide all the extra energy, which we will by then be using if the economy is in a healthy growing condition.
The second factor is the expansion of consumption in developing countries. At the very least, India and China will continue to expand at up to 8 percent per annum. So, we will have to persuade them that it is in their interest to switch to material re-tooling while they are catching up with our level of affluence (not just our level today but that which we will be reaching as our growth continues). It is hard to see us doing this coercively without a global war. To persuade them, we must prove we ourselves are quite affluent and comfortable without pumping CO 2 into the atmosphere. This considerably ups the stakes. There would be no problem if the alternatives were cheaper but they are considerably more expensive. The most likely way forward would be to demonstrate that we are fine ourselves in going ahead with an energy consumption regime of the kind we would like them to adopt. We would reduce production and consumption to a level that would be sustainable even if India and China reached that level -and keeping it at that point.
Drawing these points together. There is no way forward without a drastic reduction in consumption and production. As far as energy is concerned, the reduction has to be maintained indefinitely -we cannot expand the area of cropland to produce more biofuels and so on. The implication is zero or negative growth. Within the ownership regime of capitalism, this implies a political restraint on the owners of capital that fundamentally alters the mode of production.
A comparison between this context and other crises of accumulation in capitalism is quite misleading. A common factor in resolving other accumulation crises is the development of new strategies that provided services at a fraction of their former cost, or provided services never available before -for example the railways, automobiles and electricity. Consider the accumulation crisis of the 1970s. It is generally supposed to have come about because markets for consumer goods, even in the rich countries, had become saturated. Most people had a car, refrigerator, television, washing machine, hot water service, piped sewerage. Replacement and planned obsolescence helped, but not enough to soak up the productive capacity that had been developed to supply these goods for the first time -an overproduction crisis (Hoogvelt, 2001; Shutt, 1998) . How did globalization solve this? With a new range of products for niche markets in the global middle class. Economies of scale by marketing at once to affluent consumers across the globe. Computer-assisted manufacturing technologies to reduce the cost of switching between different products. Cutting labour costs by exporting plant to poorer countries. Cutting the costs of sea transport with containerization. Casualizing work and employment. Just-intime technologies to reduce waste. Branding to increase sales to jaded consumers. Outsourcing and forcing small supplier companies to compete to supply large multinationals (Castells, 1997; Hoogvelt, 2001; Martin and Shumann, 1997; Shutt, 1998) . The common thread linking all these innovations was that the same tasks could be done much more cheaply.
There is nothing about the switch to green energy that remotely resembles this. It is all about substituting cheap ways of producing useful energy with more expensive ways of producing the same energy. It is this simple fact that explains why the capitalist class is dragging its heels on this issue in a way that threatens our future survival. Lever-Tracy shows an awareness of this context when she talks about huge public subsidies or tight regulations, with the possibility of draconian enforcement. These are absolutely necessary because there seems to be no other way to get members of the capitalist class to engage in actions that fly in the face of their economic interests.
A second difference to the accumulation crisis of the 1970s lies in the consumers who must be targeted. Globalization targeted consumers with a lot of disposable income for niche products (Castells, 1997; Hoogvelt, 2001 ). Yet new forms of energy must be targeted to all those who use energy around the globe -including all of the poor of developing nations who are just starting to acquire motor bikes and get electric power laid on. To open this market to renewables we can either coerce them into compliance, which seems politically unlikely, produce renewables more cheaply than fossil fuels, also unlikely, or subsidize their energy use by taxing the rich countries. The latter is the most likely approach to work, but it is hardly capitalism.
When faced with this kind of critique, proponents of the ecological modernization school are likely to conclude that the capitalist mode of production will continue, even if somewhat drastic measures have to be taken to ensure its survival. After all, where is your revolutionary proletariat? Most people, and not just those in the rich countries, are still hoping for a future of capitalist affluence and growth. There is little political support for even the mild social changes proposed by the Green Parties (Gow and Leahy, 2005) .
The fact is that capitalism could come to a sticky end quite easily without the supposedly essential ingredient of a revolutionary proletariat. Capitalism as a growth economy is impossible to reconcile with a finite environment. While global warming is certainly the most problematic crisis at the moment, we are also faced with the coming oil shortage, the exhaustion of mineral deposits, the destruction of soils and the depletion of world fisheries, just to get started (McLaughlin, 1993; Trainer, 1995) . The environmental crisis, or indeed the belt tightening necessary to fix it, will put a major strain on the political accommodation that has sustained capitalism in the rich countries. It will also exacerbate tensions in developing countries where the hope of future affluence will evaporate as the rich countries go into crisis. It would be premature to foresee the capitalist mode of production as proof against these political tensions.
These are the most obvious points. A less obvious one is to wonder what would actually happen if the ecological modernization vision, or something like it, was to be successful. We can envisage two broad possibilities.
In one, the capitalist class would agree to a new dispensation and direct much productive capacity to saving the planet. To appease the working class of the rich countries, they would have to redistribute at least some wealth so people's effective incomes did not fall too far with reduced production and consumption -as energy prices went up. With zero or negative growth, unemployment would increase year by year after an initial period of restructuring. Of course, with reduced growth there would be reduced hours of work and the experience of time affluence would fundamentally shift people's orientations to work, undermining authoritative control of production. To prevent developing countries from using old fossil fuel energy technologies, governments would have to tax the rich countries and supply energy re-tooling. Or individual capitalists could donate their wealth for this purpose. Is this still capitalism? I think not. The capitalist class would be behaving more like a Trobriands Islands chieftainship; extracting surplus value and redistributing it. Even the subordinate class of the rich countries would be implicated, as their own affluence fell and developing countries were bestowed with new technologies. All this redistribution would be quite outside the norms of the market economy, which would become something of a sideline. It would be like the end of feudalism in England. Then, kings and queens reigned, lords and ladies kept their titles and even their land. But year by year, the economy and political realm functioned less and less like feudalism. Ecological modernization could mean a similar fate for capitalism.
Or in the second broad possibility, these problems could be resolved coercively. New fascist parties would preserve the affluence of the rich and the poverty of the developing countries. There would be increasing unemployment in the rich countries and the dole would be minimalist. To maintain environmental goals, the armies of the rich world might attack coal-fired power plants in India and China -with nuclear weapons if necessary. Assassination squads could terminate timber barons cutting forests. Growth for the great majority would be stalled and party hacks would take over the running of companies. Is this capitalism? I doubt it. This is a form of technocratic feudalism, which would be unable to solve environmental problems in the long term and would suffer the same kind of technological stagnation as the Soviet Union (George, 1999; Plumwood, 2002) . It would be a way station on the road to Somalia.
In fact, there is no path out of the present crisis that leaves the capitalist mode of production intact. A successful reformist approach of the kind envisaged by ecological modernists is just another path to end capitalism. Of course, the most likely outcome is that envisaged by Jared Diamond (2005) . We will end up like civilizations in the past that have undermined their environment. A last day's flurry of grand projects and expensive wars. The inevitable collapse in food production. A corresponding collapse in population. Finally, the ruling class is massacred by an ungrateful populace (Diamond, 2005) .
